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Abstract
Bayesian learning provides a core concept of information processing in financial
markets. Typically it is assumed that market participants perfectly know the qual-
ity of released news. However, in practice, news’ precision is rarely disclosed. There-
fore, we extend standard Bayesian learning allowing traders to infer news’ precision
from two different sources. If information is perceived to be imprecise, prices re-
act stronger. Moreover, interactions of the different precision signals affect price
responses nonlinearly. Empirical tests based on intra-day T-bond futures price
reactions to employment releases confirm the model’s predictions and reveal sta-
tistically and economically significant effects of news’ precision.
Keywords: Bayesian learning, information quality, precision signals,
macroeconomic announcements
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1 Introduction
Rumours, analysts’ comments or official press releases – financial markets are subject to
a huge information flow which needs to be evaluated by market participants. However,
information is of different precision and may contain errors. In such a noisy environ-
ment, Bayesian learning models are frequently used to explain how prices in financial
markets react to news releases. Most importantly, these models suggest that prices re-
act more strongly to more precise information. However, in practice, the precision of
an individual piece of new information is rarely disclosed along with the information
itself. Consequently, traders face severe uncertainty on the reliability of news which in
turn affects their trading strategy.
This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically how market participants process in-
formation when its precision is uncertain. In particular, we extend standard Bayesian
learning models by taking into account that traders use different sources to infer the
precision of the released information. This explains non-linear price reactions to unan-
ticipated information. By confirming empirically that price reactions depend crucially
on traders’ perception of news’ precision, we provide new insights into price discovery
and market participants’ learning behavior in an uncertain environment.
Among macroeconomic announcements, employment figures have the most pronounced
impact on financial markets (see, e.g., Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega, 2003).
Given their importance for macroeconomic predictions and their distinct influence on
asset prices, it is crucial for market participants to assess whether a potentially high
surprise is reliable or whether it is rather driven by noise or sampling errors. Such an
assessment naturally determines to which extent portfolios have to be reallocated and
thus affects the ultimate price reaction. Another example of information shocks are
companies’ earnings announcements which often lead to sharp stock price adjustments.
1
Although a company report contains lots of detail information about the earning power
of a company, market participants are left alone in making a judgement regarding its
reliability, i.e. its precision. Recent empirical evidence suggests that market participants
consider additional sources of information to assess news’ precision. For the employment
report, Hautsch and Hess (2007) show that revisions of the headline figure provide
information which can be exploited for such a purpose. Furthermore, for company
reports, Sloan (1996), Feltham and Pae (2000), and Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and
Tuna (2005), among others, show that accruals provide information about the quality
of stated earnings.
Our paper shows how to incorporate such effects in a Bayesian learning framework.
Basic Bayesian learning models relying on normally distributed variables with known
parameters imply that prices react linearly in response to surprises. Moreover, the
strength of this price adjustment depends on the relative precision of the announced
data compared to the precision of prior beliefs. This standard model is quite restrictive,
since it assumes news’ precision to be known and additionally requires perfect knowl-
edge of all underlying distributions. Subramanyam (1996) relaxes these assumptions
by including parameter uncertainty about news’ precision. In this framework, traders
try to infer the precision of news from the magnitude of the surprise component in an
announcement. Due to this strict link between the expected precision and the signal
magnitude, large surprises result in relatively weak price reactions which may be even
smaller than for medium surprises. Consequently, surprisingly good news may be in-
terpreted as too good to be true, as recently analyzed by Mattsson, Voorneveld, and
Weibull (2007).1 This results in S-shaped price reactions to unexpected news, i.e. price
reactions are relatively strong for small surprises, while they are relatively weak for large
1In an early contribution, Milgrom (1981) has already studied this effect and provided conditions
for monotonicity of price reactions in the announced information. These monotonicity results based on
a monotone likelihood ratio criterion were recently generalized by Mattsson, Voorneveld, and Weibull
(2007) in a discrete choice model under uncertainty.
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surprises. A restrictive assumption in this setting is that market participants assess the
reliability of news solely based on the released figures’ magnitudes and ignore any other
potentially available information on precision. This is rather unrealistic in practice and
can induce severe misinterpretations of the announced figures. Indeed, large surprises
may as well be very precise and thus should generate strong price reactions.
A key assumption in this paper is that traders do not only evaluate the news itself
but employ further sources of information to assess news’ quality. For instance, before
deciding which trading strategy to choose after a news release, market participants
are assumed to gather general information on the news provider, the general economic
environment, the underlying data source or the reliability of recent news releases. This
assumption is empirically supported by Hautsch and Hess (2007). Their results pro-
vide evidence that traders can extract the release-specific precision of unanticipated
headline information in the employment report from additional detail information. In
particular, traders may derive such a precision estimate by inspecting revisions of previ-
ously announced data. Taking into account such effects, Hautsch and Hess (2007) show
that prices in the T-bond futures market indeed react more strongly to employment
information which is perceived to be more precise.
Connecting both types of precision signals, we develop a learning model which brings
together the approaches of Hautsch and Hess (2007) and Subramanyam (1996). In
this setting, traders use two different kinds of information as precision signals. Firstly,
so-called ‘external’ precision signals – such as the sample size of a survey or the reputa-
tion of an auditing company – directly influence the perception of information precision.
Secondly, the released information itself serves as an ‘internal’ precision signal. In ac-
cordance with Subramanyam (1996) this implies that the probability for news to be
imprecise increases with its magnitude (i.e. these news are believed to be too large to
be true).We show that such learning behavior implies non-linear, S-shaped price re-
3
sponse functions, i.e. the price response coefficient becomes smaller for large absolute
surprises. Additionally, the model predicts stronger reactions to news which are per-
ceived to be more precise. In this case, the curvature of the price response function
becomes even more pronounced and strongly deviates from linearity for surprises of
high magnitude. We also show that our results hold in a framework where the precision
of the prior distribution itself is uncertain and are valid for a wide class of distributional
assumptions.
In an empirical analysis of the price reactions of CBOT T-bond futures to the release
of U.S. employment data we provide strong evidence in favor of Bayesian learning
under these two types of precision signals. From data revisions in employment releases,
we extract release-specific external precision measures, which do not depend on the
surprise itself. The estimated price response curves clearly reveal that prices (i) respond
non-linearly with an S-shaped pattern and, (ii) react significantly different depending
on the external precision signal. Also from an economic perspective, our results are
strongly significant. We show that ignoring the available precision signals leads to severe
estimation errors when determining the price impact of a news release. Altogether, our
empirical study provides strong evidence in favor of the claim of Bayesian learning that
the perceived quality of information plays an important role in determining its price
impact.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section presents a
theoretical Bayesian learning framework which allows the precision of arriving news to
be unknown and allows for uncertainty in the prior distribution. Section 3 describes
the high-frequency return data and outlines the estimation procedure. The empirical
results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 A Bayesian Learning Model
2.1 Standard Bayesian Learning
Bayesian learning models provide a framework to analyze how new information is incor-
porated into expectations and prices, while both prior information as well as incoming
news contain uncertainty. Throughout our analysis we assume that all market partici-
pants have the same information just before the release of some public announcement.
Each participant is equipped with the same utility function and the same endowment
of assets including a risky asset. The price P of this risky asset is assumed to be propor-
tional to traders’ expectations of an economic variable X with proportionality factor
ν, i.e. P = ν · E[X]. The beliefs on X prior to the announcement are assumed to be
normally distributed with known parameters, i.e. X ∼ N(µF , 1/ρF ), where µF is the
mean of the prior information on X in the market, and ρF denotes their precision,
defined as the inverse of the variance. This prior information represents the market’s
forecasted probability distribution of the variable X given all available information in-
cluding for example all publicly released analysts’ forecasts. Empirical research on the
impact of scheduled announcements typically assumes that the distribution of prior
beliefs in the market may be approximated by the distribution of analysts’ forecasts.
Hence, it is implicitly assumed that analysts’ forecasts are unbiased for X and together
with their cross-sectional dispersion they provide a consistent estimate of market’s prior
information.2
Now an announcement is released providing a noisy estimate ofX. It is assumed that the
released figure includes an additive error, i.e. A = X+ε, where ε is a zero mean normally
distributed error term with variance V ar[ε] = 1/ρε and E[X · ε] = 0. Consequently,
2See e.g. Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia (1995), Mohammed and Yadav (2002), Andersen, Boller-
slev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) and Hautsch and Hess (2007).
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traders receive an unbiased estimate of the underlying variable X whose precision
is reflected by ρε. The additive error term structure implies that the unconditional
variance of the news release exceeds the variance of the market’s prior information.
Accordingly, the announcement A is distributed as A ∼ N(µF , 1/ρA). After observing
the public announcement, traders adjust their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. Then,
traders’ posterior beliefs are normally distributed with
µP := E[X | A] = µF + (A− µF )
ρA
ρF
= µF + (A− µF )
ρε
ρF + ρε
(1)
and
ρP := V ar[X | A]
−1 = ρF + ρε. (2)
Consequently, after traders observe the signal A, the market price of the risky asset
changes as
∆P = ν · (µP − µF ) = ν · S · pi, (3)
where pi denotes the so-called ‘price-response coefficient’
pi :=
ρA
ρF
=
ρε
ρε + ρF
. (4)
Hence, the main model implication is that price changes are proportional to the surprise
S := A − µF , where the proportionality factor pi depends on the relative precision of
announcements and the market’s forecast.
2.2 Surprises as an ‘Internal’ Signal on the Precision of Releases
Announcements such as employment figures are usually released without an associated
precision measure which contradicts the assumptions of the standard Bayesian learning
model. Subramanyam (1996) relaxes the latter framework by treating news’ precision to
be unknown and assuming that the announcement is conditionally normally distributed
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given the true precision, i.e. A|ρA ∼ N(µF , ρA). Formally, Bayesian updating of traders
works similar as in the basic framework yielding
µP = E[X | A] = µF + (A− µF )
E[ρA | A]
ρF
= µF + S · pi(S), (5)
with E[ρA|A] representing traders’ conditional expectation of the signal precision given
its realization. Hence, it turns out that the price response coefficient, pi(S), is no longer
constant but depends on the absolute surprise. Consequently, the latter serves as an
‘internal’ signal on news’ precision. As shown by Subramanyam (1996) and illustrated
in a more general framework in the next section, this generates a nonlinear relationship
between the magnitude of the surprise and the implied update of traders’ beliefs. In
particular, if traders observe high absolute values of unanticipated information, they
conclude that these stem from an announcement with low precision. This reduces their
adjustment of beliefs in absolute terms which (in the extreme case) may even generate
negative marginal contributions of surprises resulting in an S-shaped price response
curve. However, this direct link between the amount of unanticipated information and
the expected precision is relatively restrictive since it implies that large surprises are
always too large to be true. Even in an environment when the information precision is
high large surprises may occur occasionally. Then, we would expect to observe a strong
price reaction.
2.3 ‘External’ Signals on the Precision of Releases
Extending the previous setting we assume that traders do not only evaluate the released
information itself, but employ other data sources. For instance, for the U.S. employ-
ment report, Hautsch and Hess (2007) show that traders may infer on the precision of
announced employment figures by inspecting the time series of historical revisions of
the headline figure. Since revisions in announcements reflect (ex post) sampling errors,
a natural precision measure arises from their conditional variance.
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Suppose that market participants are able to observe such a so-called external signal
ρˆA for the precision of the announcement ρA. Here, ‘external’ refers to the case when
the signal is not directly linked to the announced figure itself. For example, ρˆA might
be information on the sample size of a survey, the reliability of data collection or a
precision estimate based on (past) revisions as in Hautsch and Hess (2007).
Let this additional precision signal follow a conditionally normal distribution given
the true precision ρA, i.e. ρˆA | ρA ∼ N(ρA, σ
2
ρˆA
). Moreover, we assume that the an-
nouncement A and the precision signal ρˆA are conditionally independent given the true
precision ρA. Then, the precision signal and the news release are only linked indirectly
via the true precision. If σ2ρˆA reaches zero, the signal reveals the true precision of the an-
nouncement. In this case, the surprise itself does no longer serve as an internal precision
signal and we are back in the standard Bayesian learning model. If σ2ρˆA is different from
zero, both precision signals are taken into account by market participants. Analogously
to the updating equations given above, traders form their beliefs as3
µP = E [X | A, ρˆA] = µF + (A− µF )
E [ρA | A, ρˆA]
ρF
= µF + S · pi(S, ρˆA). (6)
As before, adjustments in traders’ beliefs depend symmetrically on the sign of news.
However, now the market incorporates additional information into its price formation.
This is reflected by the price response coefficient pi(·) depending not only on S but
also on ρˆA. As shown in Appendix A, the conditional expectation of the precision
E [ρA | A, ρˆA] is computed by
E [ρA | A, ρˆA] =
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
, (7)
where f(·) denote the corresponding conditional and unconditional p.d.f.’s and the
support SA of f(ρA) is given by SA ∈ (ρF ,∞). Hence, it turns out that the expected
3For a formal derivation, see Appendix A.
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precision does not only depend on ρˆA and A, but also on the unconditional prior
distribution of the precision, f(ρA).
In Proposition 1, we will show in accordance with Subramanyam (1996) that the amount
of unanticipated information influences the expected precision of the announcement
negatively. This result holds irrespective of the choice of the underlying prior distribu-
tion f(ρA):
Proposition 1 The price response coefficient pi(S, ρˆA) is strictly decreasing in
the absolute magnitude of the surprise |S| for any prior distribution f(ρA), i.e.
∂pi(S, ρˆA)/∂|S| < 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Hence, prices react relatively strongly to news with small surprises and relatively weakly
to news with a high surprise component. Consequently, there are two effects determining
the change in beliefs (µP −µF ) after an announcement is made: Firstly, given the price
response coefficient pi(·), a high (low) surprise S = A − µF strengthens (weakens) the
price reaction linearly. Secondly, according to Proposition 1, it decreases (increases) the
expected signal precision and thus decreases (increases) pi(·). As shown in Proposition
2, the latter effect induces price reactions which are S-shaped in absolute surprises:
Proposition 2 The marginal impact of the surprise S on investors’ updates of beliefs,
µP − µF , is given by ∂(µP − µF )/∂S = pi(S, ρˆA)− S
2ρ−1F V ar[ρA | A, ρˆA].
Proof: See Appendix A.
Hence, investors update their expectations in the direction with the sign of the surprise
as long as pi(S, ρˆA) − S
2ρ−1F V ar[ρA | A, ρˆA] > 0. However, if |S| becomes large, the
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relation may even reverse and the marginal effect of absolute surprises may as well
become negative, i.e. ∂(µP − µF )/∂S < 0. These effects are enforced if ρF is small
and V ar[ρA | A, ρˆA] is large. Consequently, we obtain an S-shaped price reaction as
graphically illustrated in Figure 1. Note that in case of a degenerated prior distribution
f(ρA), we get a linear response as in the basic model. Hence the results of an S-
shaped relation between surprises and traders’ updates of expectations according to
Subramanyam (1996) still holds also in this extended framework.
However, the following proposition shows that traders’ conditional expectations of news’
precision depend positively on the external precision signal ρˆA. Hence, traders positively
(negatively) update their conditional expectations if ρˆA increases (decreases). Conse-
quently, ρˆA affects the price response coefficient pi(S, ρˆA) in opposite direction than |S|.
Proposition 3 The price response coefficient pi(S, ρˆA) and the absolute signal response
|µF −µP | are strictly increasing in the observed value of the precision signal ρˆA for any
prior distribution f(ρA), i.e. ∂pi(S, ρˆA)/∂ρˆA > 0 and ∂|µp − µF |/∂ρˆA > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The proposition also states that a central implication of standard Bayesian learning
is maintained even if the true precision parameter of news is replaced by a noisy sig-
nal: Market prices react more strongly to news which is perceived to be more precise,
whereas news which appear to be imprecise induce rather moderate market reactions.
However, as shown in Figure 1, the existence of an ‘external’ precision measure ρˆA
induces an additional effect which even amplifies the S-shape. A higher ρA leads to a
straightening of the price response curve for surprises near zero but to more pronounced
S-shaped price responses to large surprises.
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2.4 Accounting for Uncertainty into the Prior Distribution
So far we assumed that traders have normally distributed prior beliefs on the distribu-
tion of the variableX with perfectly known parameters. However, traders generate their
views for example by relying on analysts’ forecasts and thus face estimation errors. In
practice, traders might approximate the precision of prior information by the dispersion
of different analysts’ forecasts. However, the quality of such estimates is itself subject
to uncertainty. In order to capture uncertainty in the precision of prior information we
assume that the latter is random and follows a distribution f(ρF ). Then, X is assumed
to be conditionally normally distributed given ρF , i.e. X | ρF ∼ N(µF , 1/ρF ). This
results in a scale mixture distribution for the prior yielding
f(X) =
∫
SF
f(X | ρF )f(ρF )dρF (8)
with SF ∈ (0,∞). Nevertheless, as shown in Proposition 4, all previous results still
hold:
Proposition 4 If the prior distribution of traders follows a scale mixture of normal
distributions, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 still hold.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Obviously, this proposition states that our analysis is not restricted to the case of
normally distributed variables but holds for a wide class of distributions, including
e.g. also fat-tailed prior distributions.
2.5 Testable Implications of the Model
The learning model outlined above yields hypotheses on how traders’ expectations ad-
just to new information. Assuming that prices are proportional to traders expectations
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of the observed market variable, the following testable hypotheses arise:
(1) The standard Bayesian learning model with perfectly known normal distributions
as presented in Section 2.1 implies a linear price response function,
∆P = ν · S · pi.
Here, a higher magnitude of surprises implies higher absolute price reactions,
since the price response coefficient, pi, is a constant and known parameter which
does not depend on the revealed unanticipated information, S. Then, the price
response coefficient is determined by the precision of the announcement and the
precision of the released data.
(2) As shown in Section 2.2, the model suggested by Subramanyam (1996) implies
∆P = ν · S · pi(S).
Here, news precision is unknown and is inferred from the magnitude of surprises.
Since large surprises serve as a signal for a low precision of news, the price response
coefficient pi(S) is decreasing in the absolute size of the surprise |S| implying an
S-shaped relationship between ∆P and S.
(3) Allowing for additional external precision signals ρˆA as in Section 2.3, we get
∆P = ν · S · pi(S, ρˆA).
Then, the previous result of an S-shaped price response curve still holds but we
observe the additional effect of a positive relation between ∆P and ρˆA. In this
case, both effects might work in opposite directions and the S-shape of the price
response curve is even amplified if news’ precision is high.
These implications will be empirically tested in the next sections.
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3 Data and Empirical Framework
3.1 Data
Note that we do not estimate the model outlined above in a structural way since this
would require additional structural assumptions in order to estimate E[ρA|A, ρˆA]. We
rather test for the implications summarized above in reduced form by estimating the
shape of the price reaction curve in dependence of S and the perceived precision of news
|ρˆA|. We use intraday returns of CBOT T-bond futures, corresponding to one of the
most liquid futures markets, to monthly releases of the U.S. employment report. The
latter is by far the most influential scheduled macroeconomic release and its impact
on financial markets is investigated in a wide range of studies.4 While the employment
report contains various detail information on the employment situation in the U.S.,
market participants focus in particular on two headline figures: the nonfarm payrolls
figure and the unemployment rate figure. The disclosure of this information offers a rare
opportunity to analyze Bayesian learning effects in price adjustment processes, since
both the amount of unanticipated information and a release-specific precision measure
can be obtained.
Hautsch and Hess (2007) document the importance of news’ precision in a framework
where traders are assumed to use external information to infer on the precision of
news. To facilitate a comparison with these results, we employ a similar data set based
on two minutes log returns of T-bond futures in 90-min windows around employment
announcements.5 However, our dataset covers an extended sample period of 15 years,
4Several empirical studies provide evidence that unanticipated information in the employment report
has a strong influence on bond market prices (e.g. Becker, Finnerty, and Kopecky (1996), Fleming and
Remolona (1999c), and Hautsch and Hess (2002)), but also on foreign exchange rates (e.g. Hardouvelis
(1988), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003)), as well as stock prices (e.g. Boyd, Hu, and
Jagannathan (2005)).
5Log returns are calculated on the basis of the last trading price observed during a 2-minute interval.
We use the same time window, i.e. 8:22-9:52 a.m. EST. Since trading starts at 8:20, the first return
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i.e. Jan. 4, 1991 to Dec. 2, 2005. These high frequency T-bond data are obtained from
the Chicago Board of Trade (via their Time & Sales records). During our sample period
we obtain 161 event windows in which no other major information event occurs besides
the release of the employment report.6 Thus information processing during these event
windows is only driven by employment figures. Like previous studies, we use so-called
consensus estimates, i.e., medians of analysts’ forecasts, to approximate the anticipated
part of information in the employment headline figures. These analysts’ forecasts are
obtained from Informa Global Markets (formerly S&P Money Market Services, MMS).
The announcement data are extracted from the original (i.e. unrevised) employment
releases of the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). In accordance with other studies,
we concentrate on the headline information in the employment report, i.e., surprises
in the nonfarm payrolls figure, SNF , and the unemployment rate, SUN .
7 Note that
nonfarm payrolls are revised in the subsequent month. We include this revision infor-
mation, RNF,m, into our analysis. In order to facilitate a direct comparison across the
information components, all surprise and revision variables are measured in percentage
changes.
In order to extract release-specific precision measures for the monthly employment re-
leases, we employ the procedure suggested by Hautsch and Hess (2007): Firstly, as a
precision measure for the prior information, the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts before
can be calculated for interval 8:22-8:24. In order to avoid that other announcements, being released at
10:00 a.m. EST., influence our results, only price observations up to 9:52 a.m. EST are used. Like most
previous studies, we focus on the front month contract, i.e. the most actively traded contract among
the nearby and second nearby contracts.
6We eliminate 15 days in which other reports where released during our 90-min window, in particular
releases of Leading Indicators, Personal Income, and Gross Domestic Product. Furthermore, we elim-
inate one inadvertently early employment release in November 1998 (Fleming and Remolona 1999b)
and another 3 releases which were presumably affected by the temporary shutdown of federal agencies
due to the budget dispute during the Clinton administration (see Hess, 2004). This leaves us with a
total of 161 observations.
7The unanticipated information contained in the releases of month m is then measured as the
difference between the announced figure A.,m and its median forecast µF,.,m. For instance, the surprise
in a non-farm payrolls figure,SNF,m, is determined as SNF,m = ANF,m − µF,NF,m.
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an announcement is used.8 In particular, the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts,
sˆF,m, for a particular month m is interpreted as a measure of the cross-sectional dis-
persion of expectations and serves as a proxy for the precision of prior information,
i.e. ρˆF,m = 1
/
sˆ2F,m . Secondly, in order to obtain a measure for the precision of the
announced information itself, a one-step-ahead prediction of the (conditional) vari-
ance of revisions is used. Using revisions in nonfarm payrolls is based on the idea
that a large revision of the previous month’s figure (as reported in the current re-
port) indicates that the precision of that figure obviously has been poor. Hautsch and
Hess (2007) illustrate that the magnitude of revisions, and thus the size of estima-
tion errors in announced figures, are autocorrelated. Hence, the size of revisions as a
proxy for news’ precision is predictable. Corresponding forecasts are obtained from an
ARMA-GARCH model fitted to the time series of revisions. Then, ρˆε,m is obtained by
ρˆε,m = V̂ ar[RNF,m|RNF,m−1, RNF,m−2, . . .]
−1.9
In order to reduce the impact of estimation noise in the quantification of news’ pre-
cision and to avoid the necessity to impose additional assumptions on the functional
relationship between the precision measure and the induced price reaction, we restrict
our analysis to a distinction between precise and imprecise news. These two states are
identified based on a proxy of the price response coefficient pˆim = ρˆε,m/(ρˆε,m + ρˆF,m).
Then, we define news to be precise if pˆim is equal to or above its sample median and
imprecise otherwise. Estimating the relationship between price changes, the surprise S
and the derived precision dummy allows us to test for the implications of the generalized
Bayesian learning framework outlined above.
8This is in accordance with Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia (1995), Mohammed and Yadav
(2002), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) and Hautsch and Hess (2007), among others.
However, note that the information set of all publicly available prior information may be even much
larger. Furthermore, as for example Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) argue, forecasts may be announced
strategically depending on the forecaster’s loss function, e.g. as the median of a distribution.
9For more details, see Hautsch and Hess (2007).
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3.2 Specification of Price Response Curves
Using 2-minute log returns rt in the described 90-minute-windows around the em-
ployment release we estimate alternative ARMA-ARCH specifications augmented with
appropriate sets of explanatory variables xt, i.e.
rt = c+
p1∑
j=1
φ1,jrt−j +
q1∑
j=1
φ2,jεt−j + x
′
tβ + εt, εt ∼ N(0, ht), (9)
with
ht = ω +
p2∑
j=1
ψ1,jε
2
t−j + z
′
tθ. (10)
Here, t indexes the 2-minute intervals around the release of the employment report for
a given month m. In particular, t = 0 indicates the interval following immediately after
the announcement, i.e. 8:30 - 8:32 a.m. EST and t = 1 denotes the 8:32 - 8:34 interval.
For simplicity, the index m is suppressed.
The conditional variance equation (10) captures ARCH effects. In addition, zt (with
corresponding parameter vector θ) consists of regressors {t¯, sin(2 ·r ·pi · t¯), cos(2 ·r ·pi · t¯)}
with r = 1, . . . , R associated with a Fourier series approximation of order R defined
over the interval t¯ ∈ (0, 1) capturing the used 90-minutes window around the announce-
ment. The latter allow us to control for (deterministic) seasonal volatility patterns
around news releases. Preliminary studies show that such a specification captures most
variations in conditional variances during the analyzed 90-minute interval.10
To test for the different implications of the Bayesian learning model discussed above,
we use alternative specifications of the vector xt. In particular, to impose the standard
Bayesian learning model in accordance with Section 2.1, a dummy variable D8:30 indi-
cating the interval 8:30 - 8:32 and a linear term in the surprise D8:30 ·SNF are included
10Nevertheless, there might be heteroscedasticity components which are still ignored in our specifi-
cation. Therefore, we use robust standard errors according to Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992).
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(among other variables) as regressors in xt:
x′t = [. . . , D8:30 , D8:30 · SNF , . . . ] ,
where SNF,m contains the unexpected component in the nonfarm payrolls figure for
month m. Obviously, this specification implies a linear price relationship between non-
farm payroll surprises and the implied return.
In order to capture the impact of an internal precision signal (in accordance with Section
2.2), we allow for non-linear price responses to news in nonfarm payrolls by including
power functions of this figure into the set of explanatory variables. To keep the model
tractable, we allow for this flexibility only in the interval 8:30-8:32, where typically
most of the price movements after announcements are realized. Correspondingly, we
model the impact of surprises in nonfarm payrolls based on the regressors
x′t =
[
. . . , D8:30 , D8:30 · SNF , D8:30 · S
2
NF , D8:30 · S
3
NF , . . .
]
.
To estimate the most general (unrestricted) model allowing for both internal and exter-
nal precision signals (in accordance with Section 2.3) we differentiate between precise
vs. imprecise announcements by interacting the corresponding regressors with a dummy
variable Dpilow which takes on the value one if the external precision signal is below its
sample median and zero otherwise:
x′t =
[
. . . , D8:30 ·D
pilow, D8:30 ·D
pihigh,
D8:30 · SNF ·D
pilow, D8:30 · SNF ·D
pihigh,
D8:30 · S
2
NF ·D
pilow, D8:30 · S
2
NF ·D
pihigh,
D8:30 · S
3
NF ·D
pilow, D8:30 · S
3
NF ·D
pihigh, . . .
]
,
where Dpihigh = 1−Dpilow. This approach is flexible enough to allow for a wide variety
of shapes of the price response function. Starting with the linear specification, the
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conventional constant price impact coefficient is obtained as a reference case. Increasing
the order of included polynomials, allows us to test whether more non-linear terms are
needed to describe the price response function appropriately. In addition, by interacting
these terms with the dummy variables indicating a low or high value of the external
precision signal, we can analyze whether the shapes of the price response functions differ
and thus can gain insights regarding the relative weight, market participants place on
internal and external precision signals.
In order to keep the model parsimonious and tractable we mainly concentrate in the
following on the price response induced by announcements in nonfarm payrolls which
is by far the most influential macroeconomic headline figure.
4 Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, we will analyze whether we find
significant evidence for S-shaped price response functions in accordance with Section
2.2. Secondly, we will investigate the impact of external precision signals on the strength
and the shape of the price response in line with Section 2.3.
4.1 Non-linearities in the Price Response due to Internal Precision
Signals
Table 1 reports estimation results based on five different specifications of equation (9).
The lag order of the autoregressive components is chosen according to the Bayes infor-
mation criterion (BIC) and reveals an AR(2)-ARCH(3) specification as the preferred
model. Besides the variables discussed in the previous section, the conditional mean
function includes additional variables consisting of surprises in the unemployment rate,
SUN , as well as revisions in the nonfarm payrolls figure, RNF . Moreover, we allow for
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potential information leakage effects in the interval 8:28-8:30 as well as lagged price
responses in the interval 8:32-8:34.
As a starting point, specification (A) provides estimation results for a basic model that
does not account for any release-specific precision of unanticipated information. The
results confirm several major findings of previous studies:11 Firstly, the large values of
the highly significant coefficients of D8:30 · SNF and D8:30 · SUN show that surprising
headline information has a strong and significant impact on intraday returns. The
directions of observed price reactions are consistent with standard theory, i.e., T-bond
futures prices rise in response to ’good’ news from the factor labor, i.e. a lower than
expected increase in nonfarm payrolls and a higher than expected unemployment rate.
Secondly, markets process unanticipated headline information very rapidly. As indicated
by the insignificant coefficient of D8:32 · SUN and the relatively small coefficient of
D8:32 ·SNF (as compared to D8:30 ·SNF ), the price reaction is completed within two to
four minutes.
Specifications (B) - (E) allow for non-linearities in price responses. Specifically, the vari-
ables capturing the immediate price impact of unanticipated information in the nonfarm
payrolls figure, D8:30 · SNF , are included as polynomial terms up to order three. Note
that the theoretical Bayesian learning model with uncertain news’ precision suggests
that price reactions are symmetric around zero. Nevertheless, the imposed polynomials
also allow for non-symmetric price responses. In particular, previous empirical studies
suggest asymmetric effects of ’good’ and ’bad’ news to information releases.12
Specification (B) shows estimation results for a quadratic specification of the price
11See, for example, Becker, Finnerty, and Kopecky (1996), Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001), Flem-
ing and Remolona (1999a, b, c), or Hautsch and Hess (2002) for bond markets and Almeida, Goodhart,
and Payne (1998) or Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) for foreign exchange markets.
12See, e.g. Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003)
and Hautsch and Hess (2007).
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response, while specification (C) includes terms up to the third order. Corresponding
likelihood ratio (LR) tests clearly reject the linear specification (A) in favor of the non-
linear models. Hence, higher order terms provide additional explanatory power for price
responses to unanticipated information in the nonfarm payroll figure. On a 1%-level,
the more parsimonious specification (C) with terms up to the third order may not be
rejected versus (D) and (E). Overall, in line with the LR tests, the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) suggests that specification (C) explains price responses best.
The results imply that the standard Bayesian learning model with a constant price re-
sponse to unanticipated information may be clearly rejected. As an illustration, Figure
2 shows the estimated price-response curve to releases of the nonfarm payroll figure un-
der specification (C). We find clear evidence for an S-shaped price response where price
reactions to ’large’ surprises are relatively weaker than reactions to ’small’ surprises.
This suggests that market participants evaluate the amount of unanticipated infor-
mation contained in an announcement as an internal signal on information precision
confirming the model by Subramanyam (1996).
4.2 External Precision Signals and the Strength of the Price Response
In order to investigate the impact of the external precision measure ρˆA, we split up the
variable D8:30 · SNF (including higher order terms) into interactions with the dummy
variables Dpihigh and Dpilow accounting for high vs. low values of pim.
The estimation results based on alternative specifications of the immediate price re-
sponse function are given in Table 2. The results for specification (F) confirm the find-
ings in Hautsch and Hess (2007) that more precise information leads to significantly
stronger price adjustments. Note that this base case does not account for nonlinear
price adjustments but implies a linear price reaction as graphically illustrated in Figure
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3. A comparison of the goodness-of-fit of specification (A) and (F) based on the BIC
suggests that the inclusion of precision dummies leads to a significant improvement
of the model’s goodness-of-fit. This impression is confirmed on the basis of a LR test
which clearly rejects specification (A) in favor of (F).
In specifications (G)-(L) the precision dummies are interacted with different power
functions of SNF of order up to three. It turns out that higher orders than three are
not required and do not significantly improve the model fit. In order to gain sufficient
insights into the underlying nonlinear effects, we consider alternative specifications
based on different polynomial functions. Specification (H) includes third order terms
for low values of the external precision signal, i.e. for Dpilow = 1, and first order terms
for high values of the external precision signal (specification (I) vice versa). Model (J)
includes third order terms forDpilow = 1, and captures quadratic impacts forDpihigh = 1
(for model (K) vice versa). The most comprehensive model (L) includes third order
terms for both low and high values of the external precision signal. However, the LR
tests as well as the BIC values prefer specification (J). Figure 4 provides a graphical
illustration of the estimated price response curves for the best performing specification
(J) over the range of observed surprise values.
Finally, a comparison of the models underlying Sections 2.3 and 2.2 is obtained on the
basis of a LR test of specification (L) against (C). Here, specification (C) is clearly
rejected.13 Note that specifications (C) and (J) yield nearly the same BIC values which
indicates that precision effects do not significantly improve the model’s goodness-of-fit
over the whole 90 minutes period. However, this is due to the fact that price adjustments
are mainly only observed over 2-4 minutes after the announcement corresponding to
2-4% of the sample. In this sense, the BIC is not very informative on the statistical (and
particularly the economic) importance of precision effects. Therefore, we rather rely on
13Note that model (C) is not nested in (J) and thus a LR test is not applicable.
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the significance of estimates and the employed LR tests which reflect that short-term
price adjustments are significantly affected by precision effects.
Thus, we can summarize that both the internal and the external precision signal con-
tribute to the explanation of differences in the strength of the price reaction. This
suggests that traders try to infer the information precision from different sources, not
only by looking at the magnitude of the surprise as suggested by Subramanyam (1996),
but also by inspecting additional detail information related to the headline figures as
suggested by Hautsch and Hess (2007).
As shown in Figure 4, prices react in a quite non-linear way if the perceived precision is
low. We find strong evidence for an S-shaped price response curve as predicted by the
model by Subramanyam (1996). In particular, the price response coefficient is decreasing
in absolute surprises, in the positive as well as in the negative surprise range. For large
negative surprises we even obtain some evidence of a negative marginal price reaction.
Moreover, we find evidence that the S-shape of the price response curve is dampened if
the external precision signal is high. Then, the curvature of the price response function
significantly declines and we observe a nearly linear relationship between price changes
and surprises. I.e., if an announcement figure is perceived to be of high precision,
market participants react to large surprises with a similar relative strength as to small
surprises. In contrast, if the external precision measure indicates a low quality of the
announced information, investors react more moderately to larger surprises. Given the
nearly linear shape of the price response curve in a state of high information precision,
we might be tempted to argue that market participants completely ignore the internal
precision signal if the perceived precision is high.
However, the model derived in 2.3 suggests that the opposite is true. In fact, non-
linearities in the price response should be only more pronounced for a high value of the
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external precision signal (recall Figure 1 for an illustration). Within our sample period,
we do not have sufficiently large enough surprise values in order to observe a situation as
depicted by Figure 1 (a). Presumably we rather face a situation as illustrated by Figure
1 (b), where in a relatively narrow region around zero the curvature is dampened and the
price response curves becomes almost linear when the precision is high. Consequently,
we should be careful in interpreting the reduced non-linearities in the price-response
curve in periods of high precision.
Note that our results are robust regarding the imposed functional from of the price re-
sponse relationship. Instead of capturing potential nonlinearities based on power func-
tions we also estimated the model based on flexible Fourier forms defined over the
range of surprises. The fact that we get quantitatively the same results indicates the
robustness of our findings.14
As it can be seen from the following example, our results are also significant from an
economic perspective. Assume that market participants observe a median sized piece of
’good’ nonfarm payrolls news (i.e. a nonfarm payrolls figure which is 0.06% lower than
the median forecast) in connection with a ’low’ external precision. According to the best
performing specification (J) accounting for both the internal and external precision,
prices increase by about 0.31% in response to this release. If, instead, market partici-
pants ignore both precision signals (in accordance with the standard Bayesian learning
model in specification (A)), prices would only increase by about 0.22%. Hence, ignoring
both precision signals would lead to a severe underestimation of the price response by
about one third. In contrast, suppose that an extreme surprise of SNF = −0, 18% is
observed, corresponding to the 90% quantile for ’good news’, again in connection with
a ’low’ external precision signal. Since the internal signal suggests a very low precision,
14For sake of brevity the latter results are not included in the paper but are available upon request
from the authors.
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according to specification (J) prices react only slightly stronger, i.e. we would observe a
return of 0, 36%. However, ignoring both precision signals would strongly overestimate
price responses by 89% expecting a return of 0, 67%.
Overall, these results provide strong evidence in favor of the claim of Bayesian learning
that the perceived quality of information plays an important role in determining its price
impact. The results suggest that market participants actually use both – internal as well
as external signals – to determine the precision of released news. Ignoring the available
precision information on news precision may result in strong over- or underestimations
of the price reaction.
5 Conclusion
If agents in financial markets are confronted with new information they process the lat-
ter by adjusting their expectations on asset values. Bayesian learning provides a concept
of how to process this information consistently. Since the precision of information is
rarely available to market participants, we derive different settings of Bayesian learning
models which allow for uncertainty in the precision of news. Within these models, one
common principle remains true: Market participants’ perception of information quality
plays a major role for the strength of price adjustments. However, this perception of
precision may be based on different precision signals.
The theoretical models show that the amount of unanticipated information in an an-
nouncement may provide traders with an ‘internal’ signal on its precision, i.e. the price
response coefficient is decreasing in the magnitude of surprises. In addition, price re-
sponses to news may be influenced by ‘external’ signals on news precision such as the
reputation of an auditing company, the reliability of a newspaper or the data coverage
of an agency. If we observe a high value for such an external precision measure the price
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response to a given surprise is relatively stronger than in a situation of low perceived
precision.
To test these implications, we focus on the most influential macroeconomic report, i.e.,
the U.S. employment release. For its headline figures, this report does not contain any
release-specific precision measures. However, market participants may extract precision
measures of the released headline figures by analyzing related detail information. As
suggested by Hautsch and Hess (2007), revisions of previously announced figures in
connection with the cross-sectional standard deviations of analysts’ forecasts may be
used to derive such an external precision measure.
We investigate the price reaction of CBOT T-bond futures to these employment an-
nouncements using high-frequency data. The price response curves extracted from the
data illustrate a non-linear price impact of information depending on its surprise com-
ponent. As predicted by theory, our empirical results suggest that market participants
seem to interpret the magnitude of the surprise contained in a signal as an internal
indication of its precision. Consequently, if traders observe an announcement that de-
viates much from their expectations, they tend to conclude that this announcement is
less precise.
Using the precision measures proposed by Hautsch and Hess (2007) as an additional
external signal on the precision of the released data, we confirm the strong link between
the perceived precision of news and the price response. If the precision signal derived
from past revision data indicates a high relative precision level of news, market prices
react stronger to the unanticipated part of the data. If the external precision signal
indicates a poor quality of the released figures, market prices react only weakly.
Overall, our empirical analysis provides evidence in favor of Bayesian learning under
the presence of uncertain precision of news. The results show that the quality of news
25
significantly determine their implied price impact. The results suggest that if exact
quality measures for a release are missing, traders try to infer news’ precision by drawing
on different sources. When observing a piece of news, they assess themselves how precise
it is. While doing that, market participants seem to include information on the reliability
of the source of the message.
To our knowledge, the present analysis is the first that describes the impact of these
two simultaneous – internal and external – precision signals in a unified framework.
Such Bayesian learning models accounting for uncertain news precision provide further
insights into price formation mechanisms and help to assess risky positions. For exam-
ple, to infer how the release of an unexpectedly high unemployment figure will affect
the value of a bond portfolio, traders and portfolio managers need to use an adequate
model for the price impact of employment data. We show that ignoring the available in-
formation on announcements’ precision may result in strong over- or underestimations
of the price impact of news.
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Appendix A
We first derive the posterior beliefs of traders after observing an announcement and a
proxy for the precision of the signal. Recall the assumption that the random variables
A and ρˆA are conditionally independent given the precision ρA, i.e.
fA,ρˆA|ρA(A, ρˆA | ρA) = fA|ρA(A | ρA)fρˆA|ρA(ρˆA | ρA). (11)
Then, the conditional expectation of X given A and ρˆA is given by
µP = E [X | A, ρˆA]
= E [E [X | A, ρˆA, ρA] | A, ρˆA]
= E [µF + (A− µF )ρA/ρF | A, ρˆA]
= µF + E [(A− µF )ρA/ρF | A, ρˆA]
= µF + (A− µF )E [ρA | A, ρˆA] /ρF
≡ µF + S · pi(S, ρˆA).
The expected precision of the announcement is given as
E [ρA | A, ρˆA] =
∫
SA
ρAf(ρA | A, ρˆA)dρA
=
∫
SA
ρA
f(A, ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)
f(A, ρˆA)
dρA
=
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
f(A, ρˆA)
=
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA∫
SA
f(A, ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
=
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
,
where the support of f(ρA) is given by SA ∈ (ρF ,∞).
Using these relations we now turn to the proofs of the particular theorems.
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Proof of Theorem 1: Note that ∂f(A | ρA)∂S
2 =
(
−12ρA
)
f(A | ρA), since we
assumed that A is conditionally normally distributed given ρA. We need to show that
the partial derivative of the conditional expected precision with respect to the absolute
surprise is strictly negative.
∂E [ρA | A, ρˆA]
∂S2
=
∂
∂S2
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
=
( ∂
∂S2
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
(
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
−
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA(
∂
∂S2
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)
(
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
=
−12
∫
SA
ρ2Af(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
(
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
−
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA(−
1
2)
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
(
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
= −
∫
SA
ρ2Af(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
2
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
+
(
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)
2
2(
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA)2
= −
1
2
[∫
SA
ρ2Af(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
−
(∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
)2
= −
1
2
(
E[ρ2A | A, ρˆA]− (E[ρA | A, ρˆA])
2
)
= −
1
2
V ar[ρA | A, ρˆA] < 0,
for any non-degenerate distribution of the precision ρA. Since |S| and S
2 are positively
and monotonically related, the result can be applied for |S|. Then, it is straightforwardly
shown that ∂pi(S, ρˆA)/∂|S| < 0.

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Proof of Theorem 2: Note that ∂f(A | ρA)∂S = −ρASf(A | ρA), since we assumed
that A is conditionally normally distributed given ρA. Then,
∂E [ρA | A, ρˆA]
∂S
= 2S ·
∂E [ρA | A, ρˆA]
∂S2
.
Hence, using Theorem 1 we get
∂E [ρA | A, ρˆA]
∂S
= −S · V ar[ρA | A, ρˆA]
and thus
∂(µP − µF )
∂S
= pi(S, ρˆA) +
S
ρF
∂E[ρA|A, ρˆA]
∂S
= pi(S, ρˆA)−
S2
ρF
V ar[ρA | A, ρˆA].

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Proof of Theorem 3: Note that ∂f(ρˆA | ρA)∂ρˆA =
(
− ρˆA−ρA
2σ2
ρˆA
)
f(ρˆA | ρA), since we
assumed a normal distribution for ρˆA. We need to show that the partial derivative of the
conditional expected precision with respect to the precision signal is strictly positive,
∂E[ρA | A, ρˆA]
∂ρˆA
=
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)
∂f(ρˆA|ρA)
∂ρˆA
f(ρA)dρA
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA(∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
)2
−
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)
∂f(ρˆA|ρA)
∂ρˆA
f(ρA)dρA(∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
)2
=
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)
(
− ρˆA−ρA
2σ2
ρˆA
)
f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA(∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
)2
−
∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
∫
SA
f(A | ρA)
(
− ρˆA−ρA
2σ2
ρˆA
)
f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA(∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
)2
=
1
2σ2ρˆA
[∫
SA
ρ2Af(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
−
(∫
SA
ρAf(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA∫
SA
f(A | ρA)f(ρˆA | ρA)f(ρA)dρA
)2
=
1
2σ2ρˆA
(
E[ρ2A | A, ρˆA]− (E[ρA | A, ρˆA])
2
)
=
1
2σ2ρˆA
V ar[ρA | A, ρˆA] > 0,
for any non-degenerate distribution of the precision ρA. Then, it is straightforwardly
shown that ∂pi(S, ρˆA)/∂ρˆA > 0 and ∂|µP − µF |/∂ρˆA > 0.

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Proof of Theorem 4: The posterior mean of X is written as
µP = E [X | A, ρˆA]
= E [E [X | A, ρF , ρA, ρˆA] | A, ρˆA]
= E [(A− µF )ρA/ρF + µF | A, ρˆA]
= µF + (A− µF ) · E [ρA/ρF | A, ρˆA]
= µF + (A− µF ) ·
∫
SF
∫
SA
ρA/ρF f(A, ρˆA | ρA, ρF )f(ρA, ρF )dρAdρF
= µF + (A− µF ) ·
∫
SF
1/ρF
∫
SA
ρAf(A, ρˆA | ρA, ρF )f(ρA | ρF )dρA︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[ρA|A,ρF ,ρˆA]
f(ρF )dρF
≡ µF + (A− µF ) · pi(S, ρˆA).
Using the result established in Theoreom 1, we can show
∂pi(S)/∂S2 =
∂
∂S2
∫
SF
1/ρF
∫
SA
ρAf(A, ρˆA | ρA, ρF )f(ρA | ρF )dρAf(ρF )dρF
=
∫
SF
1/ρF
∂
∫
SA
ρAf(A, ρˆA | ρA, ρF )f(ρA | ρF )dρA
∂S2
f(ρF )dρF
=
∫
SF
1/ρF
∂E [ρA | A, ρF , ρˆA]
∂(S2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
f(ρF )dρF < 0.
Here, the price response coefficient pi(S, ρˆA) is just a weighted average of the price
response coefficients in the case of a known variance of the prior information weighted
by the corresponding probability. Hence, the results established by Theorems 1 and 3
still hold analogously.
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(a) Large range of surprises
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(b) Small range of surprises
Figure 1: Price response curves resulting from the Bayesian learning model, x-axis: surprises
in the announcement S = (A−µA), i.e. deviations of the announced figure from its mean, y-axis: price
responses, i.e. changes in expectations µP −µF . The graphs show a numerical example of price response
curves given the model specification in section 2.3. Prior beliefs are normally distributed with µF = 0
and ρF = 1, while news’ precision ρA follows a truncated gamma distribution with scale parameter
λ = 1 and shape parameter r = 1. Additionally, an external estimate of news’ precision ρˆA is observed
which is normally distributed as ρˆA ∼ N(ρA, σρˆA). Price response curves are increasing in the observed
value of the precision proxy, the graphs correspond to external precision signals of ρˆA = 0.5, 1, 1.5 while
we choose σρˆA = 0.25.
32
Figure 2: Estimated price-response curve allowing for internal precision signals, x-axis:
surprises in the U.S. nonfarm payrolls figure SNF (in percentage points), y-axis: estimated price response
rˆt (log-returns ×1000). This figure provides an illustration of the price response curve to surprises in
announcements of nonfarm payrolls figures corresponding to specification (C) in table 1. The results
are based on a QML estimation of AR(2)-ARCH(3) models for 2-min log returns during the intraday
interval 8:22-9:52 a.m. EST at employment announcement days for which no other macroeconomic
report is released at the same time. The sample period is Jan. 1991 - Dec. 2005, resulting in 7245
observations (i.e. 161 days with no overlapping announcements × 45 2-min intervals). According to
the Bayes information criterion (BIC), the model that includes polynomial terms in nonfarm payrolls
surprises up to the third order provides the best specification. So as predicted by the theoretical model,
the resulting price response curves are non-linear since large surprises serve as a signal for low news’
precision. Therefore, high surprises in the announced figure lead to relatively weaker price reactions
than small surprises.
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Figure 3: Estimated linear price-response curves for high and low external precision sig-
nals, x-axis: surprises in the U.S. nonfarm payrolls figure SNF (in percentage points), y-axis: estimated
price response rˆt (log-returns ×1000). A graphical illustration of the price response curve to nonfarm
payrolls figures as described by specification (F) in table 2. The results are based on a QML estima-
tion of AR(2)-ARCH(3) models for 2-min log returns during the intraday interval 8:22-9:52 a.m. EST
at employment announcement days for which no other macroeconomic report is released at the same
time. The sample period is Jan. 1991 - Dec. 2005, resulting in 7245 observations (i.e. 161 days with no
overlapping announcements × 45 2-min intervals). The curve corresponding to high precision signals
has a significantly larger slope. A higher external precision signal leads to stronger price reactions given
the same amount of unexpected information in a news release.
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Figure 4: Estimated price-response curves allowing for internal and external precision
signals, x-axis: surprises in the U.S. nonfarm payrolls figure SNF (in percentage points), y-axis: es-
timated price response rˆt (log-returns ×1000). A graphical illustration of the price response curve to
nonfarm payrolls figures as described by specification (J) in table 2. The results are based on a QML
estimation of AR(2)-ARCH(3) models for 2-min log returns during the intraday interval 8:22-9:52
a.m. EST at employment announcement days for which no other macroeconomic report is released at
the same time. The sample period is Jan. 1991 - Dec. 2005, resulting in 7245 observations (i.e. 161 days
with no overlapping announcements × 45 2-min intervals). Prices tend to react stronger to news with
a high precision signal. For high precision signals polynomial terms in nonfarm payroll surprises only
up to second order are captured, while for low precision signals terms up to third order are included.
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TABLE 1
Estimation of price response functions
with surprises as an internal precision signal
Model (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Mean equation
cons -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002
D8:28 · SNF 4,406 3,619 3,927 4,078 3,829
D8:30 -0,080 0,530 0,355 0,558 0,637
D8:30 · S1NF -37,873 *** -42,415 *** -53,447 *** -54,909 *** -50,344 ***
D8:30 · S2NF -91,220 ** -55,336 * -119,526 -145,530
D8:30 · S3NF 531,752 *** 624,49 *** 80,073
D8:30 · S4NF 1658,397 2337,978
D8:30 · S5NF 9945,756
D8:32 · SNF -4,000 ** -4,322 ** -4,274 ** -4,181 ** -4,277 **
D8:28 · SUN 1,636 1,278 1,320 1,314 1,175
D8:30 · SUN 5,003 ** 5,617 ** 5,746 *** 6,212 *** 6,367 ***
D8:32 · SUN 1,448 * 1,325 1,356 1,332 1,286
D8:28 ·RNF 2,206 1,841 2,010 1,999 1,839
D8:30 ·RNF -6,872 *** -6,390 *** -6,215 ** -5,889 ** -5,808 **
D8:32 ·RNF 0,083 -0,428 -0,071 -0,106 -0,258
rt−1 -0,091 *** -0,091 *** -0,090 *** -0,090 *** -0,091 ***
rt−2 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Variance equation
cons 0,439 *** 0,439 *** 0,436 *** 0,436 *** 0,437 ***
ARCH(1) 0,148 ** 0,141 *** 0,146 *** 0,145 *** 0,144 ***
ARCH(2) 0,057 *** 0,059 *** 0,058 *** 0,058 *** 0,058 ***
ARCH(3) 0,031 *** 0,033 *** 0,034 *** 0,034 *** 0,034 ***
LL -8020,69 -7999,57 -7987,29 -7985,32 -7984,12
BIC 2,2485 2,2439 2,2417 2,2424 2,2433
LR-Test against model (A) 42,24 *** 66,80 *** 70,73 *** 73,13 ***
LR-Test against model (B) 24,56 *** 28,49 *** 30,89 ***
LR-Test against model (C) 3,93 ** 6,33 **
LR-Test against model (D) 2,40
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TABLE 1 (continued)
QML estimation of AR(2)-ARCH(3) models for 2-min log returns during the intraday interval 8:22-9:52
a.m. EST at employment announcement days for which no other macroeconomic report is released at the
same time. The sample period is Jan. 1991 - Dec. 2005, resulting in 7245 observations (i.e. 161 days with
no overlapping announcements × 45 2-min intervals).
The estimated model for log returns rt is given by rt = c+
∑
2
j=1 φjrt−j + x
′
tβ + εt, where εt ∼ N(0, ht),
t indexes the first interval after the announcement, 8:30-8:32 a.m., xt denotes a vector of explanatory
variables and β is the corresponding coefficient vector. ht is given by ht = ω +
∑
3
j=1 ψjε
2
t−j + st, where
st = δ
s
· t +
∑
5
j=1
(
δsc,j cos(j · t · 2pi) + δ
s
s,j sin(j · t · 2pi)
)
denotes the seasonality function based on the
parameters δs, δsc,j , δ
s
s,j and a normalized time trend t ∈ [0, 1] given by the elapsed time (in minutes) in
the interval 8:22 to 9:52 a.m. divided by 90. The estimated seasonality parameters are omitted in the
table.
Regressors xt are the surprise in U.S. nonfarm payrolls, SNF , and in unemployment rates, SUN , as well
as revisions of nonfarm payrolls RNF interacted with time dummies indicating the intervals 8:28-8:30
a.m. (D8:28), 8:30-8:32 a.m. (D8:30) and 8:32-8:34 a.m. (D8:32). To capture non-linear immediate price
responses in the interval 8:30-8:32, surprises in nonfarm payrolls SNF are included as polynomials up to
the order 5. Surprises are computed based on U.S. employment report figures released by the BLS and
consensus forecasts provided by Informa Global Markets, formerly MMS.
The table reports the log likelihood (LL), the Bayes information criterion (BIC) and χ2 statistics of LR
tests on the inequality of individual parameters. Statistical inference is based on QML standard errors
(Bollerslev and Wooldridge 1992). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Except for the LR tests, the level of significance is based on two-sided tests.
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TABLE 2
Estimation of price response functions
differentiated by low and high values of the additional external precision proxy
Model (F) (G) (H) (I)
Mean equation
cons -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002
D8:28 · SNF 4,365 3,411 3,862 4,147
D8:30 ·Dpilow -0,074 0,782 0,611 -0,069
D8:30 ·Dpihigh -0,141 0,315 -0,131 0,203
D8:30 · S1NF ·D
pilow -30,439 *** -34,498 *** -46,901 *** -30,356 ***
D8:30 · S1NF ·D
pihigh -47,601 *** -53,413 *** -47,713 *** -56,190 ***
D8:30 · S2NF ·D
pilow -106,693 ** -77,937 **
D8:30 · S2NF ·D
pihigh -87,544 * -61,651
D8:30 · S3NF ·D
pilow 503,544 **
D8:30 · S3NF ·D
pihigh 217,349
D8:32 · SNF -4,020 ** -4,694 ** -4,422 ** -4,305 **
D8:28 · SUN 1,623 1,197 1,327 1,499
D8:30 · SUN 5,553 ** 6,275 *** 6,286 *** 5,723 **
D8:32 · SUN 1,484 * 1,286 1,414 1,349
D8:28 ·RNF 2,051 1,701 1,989 1,885
D8:30 ·RNF -5,901 ** -5,220 ** -5,424 ** -5,585 **
D8:32 ·RNF -0,080 -0,664 0,010 -0,460
rt−1 -0,091 *** -0,091 *** -0,091 *** -0,090 ***
rt−2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Variance equation
cons 0,437 *** 0,437 *** 0,437 *** 0,437 ***
ARCH(1) 0,151 ** 0,143 ** 0,148 ** 0,148 **
ARCH(2) 0,057 *** 0,059 *** 0,057 *** 0,058 ***
ARCH(3) 0,032 *** 0,035 *** 0,033 *** 0,034 ***
LL -8008,54 -7982,99 -7981,52 -8002,00
BIC 2,2476 2,2430 2,2426 2,2482
LR-Test against model (A) 24,30 *** 75,40 *** 78,34 *** 37,38 ***
LR-Test against model (C)
LR-Test against model (F) 51,10 *** 54,04 *** 13,08 ***
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TABLE 2 (continued)
Estimation of price response functions
differentiated by low and high values of the additional external precision proxy
Model (J) (K) (L)
Mean equation
cons -0,002 -0,002 -0,002
D8:28 · SNF 3,660 3,400 3,651
D8:30 ·Dpilow 0,630 0,774 0,624
D8:30 ·Dpihigh 0,323 0,236 0,264
D8:30 · S1NF ·D
pilow -46,957 *** -34,580 *** -46,950 ***
D8:30 · S1NF ·D
pihigh -53,605 *** -55,948 *** -55,534 ***
D8:30 · S2NF ·D
pilow -78,320 ** -106,453 ** -78,297 **
D8:30 · S2NF ·D
pihigh -89,156 * -66,847 -73,585
D8:30 · S3NF ·D
pilow 512,233 ** 509,326 **
D8:30 · S3NF ·D
pihigh 186,343 141,106
D8:32 · SNF -4,692 ** -4,693 ** -4,692 **
D8:28 · SUN 1,169 1,207 1,176
D8:30 · SUN 6,694 *** 6,097 *** 6,556 ***
D8:32 · SUN 1,230 1,338 1,267
D8:28 ·RNF 1,707 1,745 1,744
D8:30 ·RNF -4,736 ** -5,464 ** -4,932 **
D8:32 ·RNF -0,549 -0,510 -0,435
rt−1 -0,091 *** -0,091 *** -0,091 ***
rt−2 0,000 0,000 0,000
Variance equation
cons 0,436 *** 0,437 *** 0,436 ***
ε2t−1 0,146 ** 0,143 ** 0,146 **
ε2t−2 0,059 *** 0,059 *** 0,058 ***
ε2t−3 0,035 *** 0,035 *** 0,035 ***
LL -7974,53 -7982,74 -7974,38
BIC 2,2419 2,2441 2,2431
LR-Test against model (A) 92,32 *** 75,90 *** 92,62 ***
LR-Test against model (C) 25,82 ***
LR-Test against model (F) 68,02 *** 51,59 *** 68,31 ***
LR-Test against model (G) 16,92 *** 0,50 17,21 ***
LR-Test against model (H) 13,98 *** 14,27 ***
LR-Test against model (I) 38,51 *** 55,22 ***
LR-Test against model (J) 0,29
LR-Test against model (K) 16,71 ***
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TABLE 2 (continued)
QML estimation of AR(2)-ARCH(3) models for 2-min log returns during the intraday interval 8:22-9:52
a.m. EST at employment announcement days for which no other macroeconomic report is released at the
same time. The sample period is Jan. 1991 - Dec. 2005, resulting in 7245 observations (i.e. 161 days with
no overlapping announcements × 45 2-min intervals).
The estimated model for log returns rt is given by rt = c+
∑
2
j=1 φjrt−j + x
′
tβ + εt, where εt ∼ N(0, ht),
t indexes the first interval after the announcement, 8:30-8:32 a.m., xt denotes a vector of explanatory
variables and β is the corresponding coefficient vector. ht is given by ht = ω +
∑
3
j=1 ψjε
2
t−j + st, where
st = δ
s
· t +
∑
5
j=1
(
δsc,j cos(j · t · 2pi) + δ
s
s,j sin(j · t · 2pi)
)
denotes the seasonality function based on the
parameters δs, δsc,j , δ
s
s,j and a normalized time trend t ∈ [0, 1] given by the elapsed time (in minutes) in
the interval 8:22 to 9:52 a.m. divided by 90. The estimated seasonality parameters are omitted in the
table.
Regressors xt are the surprise in U.S. nonfarm payrolls, SNF , and in unemployment rates, SUN , as well
as revisions of nonfarm payrolls RNF interacted with time dummies indicating the intervals 8:28-8:30
a.m. (D8:28), 8:30-8:32 a.m. (D8:30) and 8:32-8:34 a.m. (D8:32). Surprises are computed based on
U.S. employment report figures released by the BLS and consensus forecasts provided by Informa Global
Markets (IGM), formerly MMS. The variables SNF are included as polynomials up to order 3 and
interact with dummy variables Dpi high (Dpi low) which takes on the value 1 if estimated price-response
coefficient pˆim at month m is higher (lower) than its sample median, and 0 otherwise. pˆim is given
by pˆim = ρˆA,m/ (ρˆF,m + ρˆA,m), where ρˆA,m = 1/gˆm+1|m, gˆm+1|m is the one-step-ahead prediction of
the conditional variance of (percentage) revision of the nonfarm payroll figure in month m, R˙NF,m,
computed based on rolling sample ARMA-GARCH models for the time series of historical revisions,
and ρˆF,m = 1/sˆ
2
F,m with sˆF,m denoting the cross-sectional standard deviation of IGM forecasts for the
employment release for a particular month m.
The table reports the log likelihood (LL), the Bayes information criterion (BIC) and χ2 statistics of LR
tests on the inequality of individual parameters. Statistical inference is based on QML standard errors
(Bollerslev and Wooldridge 1992). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Except for the LR tests, the level of significance is based on two-sided tests.
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